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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Appellate jurisdiction to decide this appeal is granted to the 
Utah Supreme Court under authority of U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)(i) (ch. 
1953, as amended)• Defendant/Appellant was convicted by the State 
of Utah in the First Judicial District Court, Box Elder County with 
murder in the second degree, a felony of the first degree; aggrava-
ted assault, a felony of the third degree; and threatening or using 
a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, a class B misdemeanor. 
The jury verdict of guilty was pronounced on January 26, 1990. 
Sentence was pronounced on February 21, 1990, and the Appellant 
filed a Motion for New Trial on March 2, 1990, together with an 
Affidavit (R352). A hearing on the Motion for New Trial was held 
March 23, 1990. Thereafter on May 4, 1990, Judge Gunnell denied 
the Motion for New Trial, and Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 
on May 31, 1990, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 4(b). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW FOR EACH ISSUE WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
1. Was Appellant denied his United States Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right and State of Utah 
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, a fair 
trial, due process, and equal protection as a result of the follow-
ing acts of the Trial Court: 
a. initially refusing to appoint, and then belatedly 
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appointing a private investigator to assist Appellant's trial 
counsel in pretrial investigation and preparation? 
b. denying a Motion for Continuance and direct denial 
of Appellant's Motion to Appoint Psychological and Expert Personnel 
and Motion to Allow Psychological Testing and Mental Evaluation for 
the purpose of establishing by expert testimony that the Appellant 
could not and did not form the intent to commit second degree 
murder due to voluntary intoxication? 
c. denying Appellant's Motion for the Jury to View the 
Scene of the Crime? 
d. requiring the jury to sit all day in the jury room 
while waiting for the jury instructions to be prepared? 
The standard of review in regard to these issues are both 
constitutional law, see Ake vs, Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 
S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98, and whether the Court abused its discretion. 
State vs. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. 2d 74, (UT 1945). 
2. Did the following acts of the Box Elder County Attorney 
constitute reversible error either through improper statements made 
individually or cumulatively, and did the Trial Court commit 
reversible error by denying Appellant's Motion for a Mistrial based 
upon the acts set forth in subparagraphs a. through d. below: 
a. Allowing perjured testimony of Richard Anderson, an 
eye-witness, to be used at trial; 
b. By discounting Defendant's claim of self-defense, by 
remarking that it was made up and rehearsed; 
c. Failure to produce the so-called weapon (sharpening 
stone) used in the aggravated assault against Eddie Apodaca. 
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d. Vouching for the credibility of Richard Anderson, 
the State of Utah's key eyewitness. 
The standard of review in regard to improper prosecutorial 
statements or actions is whether the prosecutor's remarks or 
actions brought to the attention of the jurors matters that they 
would not be justified in considering in reaching their verdict, 
and if so, whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
misconduct so prejudiced the jury that a favorable result for the 
Defendant would have occurred. State vs. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 
(UT 1988). Ruling on whether the conduct of the prosecution 
warranted a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion. 
3. Did Appellant's trial counsel fail to provide Appellant 
with effective assistance of counsel as required by the United 
States Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution? In 
order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the Appellant 
must show; (1) that the Appellant's trial counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that a 
reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the result would have been different. State 
vs. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (UT 1985). In other words, was the 
Appellant prejudiced by his counsels performance to such an extent 
that the trial cannot be relied upon as producing a just result? 
4. Did the Court unfairly deny Appellant's Motion for a New 
Trial by failing to consider the testimony of 3 Co-Defendants, (who 
are eyewitnesses that testified in later separate trial, but 
refused to testify in Appellant's trial by exercising their Fifth 
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Amendment rights against self-incrimination) in light of their 
exonerating statements? The standard of review is whether the 
Trial Court abused its discretion. State vs> Harris, 513 P.2d 438 
(UT 1973)• 
5. Was Appellant denied a fair trial because the Jury, Court 
and Criminal System was prejudiced towards him? Appellant has 
personally requested to counsel that these matters be presented to 
the Court, but has no supporting authority. 
6. Was there cumulative error made in this case, sufficient 
to warrant a reversal of Appellant's conviction? Cumulative error 
exists if the cumulative impact of substantial errors prejudiced 
Appellant's right to a fair trial. See State vs. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501-02 (UT 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules is determinative of the issues stated: 
Point 1: Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 12 
Constitution of Utah 
U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) 
U.C.A. 76-5-203(1) 
U.C.A. 77-14-3 
Point 2: Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
Point 3: Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
U.C.A. 77-14-3 
Point 4: Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
U. C. A. 77-14-3 
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Point 5: Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
Point 6: Sixth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Criminal Information filed against Appellant in the First 
Circuit Court of Box Elder County, Utahf (R-4) charged Appellant 
and three Co-Defendants, Don Brown, William Cummins, and Billy 
Cayer, with committing the crime of murder in the second degree, a 
felony of the first degree, on the night of October 25, 1989, in 
violation of U.C.A. 76-5-203 (1953 As Amended), ' Additionally, 
Appellant alone was charged with two separate counts of aggravated 
assault, each a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-4-203 
(1953 As Amended). (R-4) Allegedly all four defendants jointly and 
in concert caused the death of Miguel (Mike) Ramirez resulting from 
numerous blows from the defendant's feet, hands, and a wrench, 
wielded solely by Appellant, during a fight that occurred outside 
of the trailer houses where the Defendants were employed. All of 
the Defendants, as well as the State's three eyewitnesses to the 
alleged crime, Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie Apodaca, 
resided in a small trailer camp consisting of four trailers parked 
on a remote piece of land located on the Northwest shore of the 
Great Salt Lake. The trailers were owned by Western Brine Shrimp 
Company, which employed all of the Defendants and eyewitnesses. 
The evidence was that the night of October 25, 1989 was dark, 
cloudy, and a moonless night; the only outside lighting for tens of 
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years to life, with all counts to run concurrently, 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
According to the testimony of Eddie Apodaca, one of the 
State's three eyewitnesses, that on the evening of October 25, 
1989, the Appellant, along with eight other employees of Western 
Brine Shrimp Company, were present and residing in three trailer 
houses located on the company's property on the northwest side of 
the Great Salt Lake. [T19-20] Of the nine crew members, Richard 
Anderson and Eric Tilley, the State's other eyewitnesses, and 
Sherman Gallardo resided in Trailer #1.[T19,33] Eddie Apodaca, 
Appellant, and Miguel (Mike) Ramirez, the victim, resided in 
trailer #2, up until the night of the incident. [T19,20,33] Billy 
Cayer, Don Brown, and William Cummins resided in trailer #3. At 
approximately 9:45 p.m., William Cummins went to trailer #2 
[T19-20; 534] and asked Eddie Apodaca to come over to trailer #3. 
[T20] When Eddie Apodaca entered trailer #3, the residents of 
trailer #3 as well as Appellant were present [T20], who had taken 
some of his items to trailer #3, were drinking whiskey and vodka. 
[T31] In a friendly manner, Eddie Apodaca took a drink. [T32] Don 
Brown accused Eddie Apodaca of acting like he was the foreman of 
the crew. Appellant also expressed his displeasure with Eddie 
Apodaca for failing to help Appellant with some work. [T21] At 
this point in time, Eddie Apodaca's story begins to differ 
materially from the Appellant's testimony, which is set forth 
below. Eddie's story was that he was struck in the back of the 
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miles around the camp were the dim lights coming from the trailers 
themselves. 
On that night of October 25, sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 
midnight, Appellant and Co-Defendants Cummins, Brown, and Cayer 
were sitting in a trailer consuming alcoholic beverages. Eddie 
Apodaca, a worker at the camp, came to the trailer and an argument 
started between Appellant and Apodaca, and thereafter, Appellant 
struck Apodaca. Apodaca got up and returned to his trailer and 
started to dress while explaining what had happened to his room-
mate, Mike Ramirez. Thereafter Brown, Cummins, Cayer and Appellant 
entered Apodaca and Ramirez's trailer. Subsequently, another fight 
ensued, knives were drawn, and Mike left the trailer. Cummins, 
Brown, and Appellant were all among the three or four people, other 
than the victim, that participated in the latter part of the fight 
that occurred outside the trailers, when the fight escalated and 
weapons were used. Eventually, the fight ended, but the next 
morning, near five o'clock, Ramirez died of multiple blunt trauma 
injury. 
Appellant properly raised the following defenses: voluntary 
intoxication as precluding him from forming the requisite intent 
for a second degree murder; self-defense because the victim wielded 
a knife; and either non-participation in or withdrawal from the 
fight that occurred after Appellant had defended himself from 
Ramirez outside the trailers. After a separate jury trial lasting 
five days, the Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder, 
aggravated assault, and threatening or using a dangerous weapon in 
a fight or quarrel and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five 
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head with a sharpening stone by Appellant. [T21] Then after a 
struggle, Eddie ran back to his trailer. [T22] Shortly thereafter, 
defendants Don Brown, William Cummins, Billy Cayer, and Appellant 
all entered trailer #2 at approximately the same time. [T22] 
Appellant was seen holding nunchunks. [T23] Mike Ramirez jumped 
between Eddie Apodaca and the four men. [T23] Cummins stated they 
should get a knife in Mike Ramirez's pocket. [T23] Then, both Mike 
Ramirez and Don Brown pulled out knives. [T24] After Mike Ramirez 
dropped his knife, he was pulled out of trailer #2. [T24] Billy 
Cayer remained with Eddie Apodaca in trailer #2. [T25] 
Billy Cayer, who was drunk, tried to hit Eddie Apodaca several 
times. [T25] A few minutes later Don Brown came back into trailer 
#2 and told Billy Cayer to leave Eddie Apodaca alone, and to gather 
his things and leave camp. [T26] 
As Eddie Apodaca exited trailer #2 and ran between trailers #1 
and #2 [T26], he saw Mike Ramirez lying on the ground [T54] being 
kicked by a blur of people standing around him. William Cummins 
then asked Eddie Apodaca if he was going to help his buddy just 
prior to striking Eddie Apodaca and knocking him down behind the 
trailers. [T26] 
As soon as Eddie Apodaca returned to his feet, Appellant came 
at him with a wrench in his hand. [T27] Eddie Apodaca took off 
running to the north [T26] , ran into bags of brine shrimp eggs 
[T56,526], and then heard William Cummins say "leave him alone", 
"let him go", "let's finish this guy", or something like that. 
Eddie Apodaca did not know whether anyone was following him because 
it was pretty dark. After running about 60 feet, Eddie Apodaca 
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looked back between the trailers and saw a blur of more than one 
person standing around Mike Ramirez. [T56-57] 
According to the testimony of Richard Anderson, another 
eyewitness, he was awakened by a commotion around 10:30 p.m. [T64] 
Eric Tilley's testimony was that he was the first person to get up 
in trailer #1 and rousted Anderson out of bed. [T150] Richard 
Anderson stated, "let's not get involved", [T152] and consequently 
Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and their roommate Sherman Gallardo 
waited a couple of minutes before Sherman Gallardo opened the door 
to their trailer to look outside. [T152] However, Richard Anderson 
testified that as soon as he heard the sounds outside his trailer, 
he looked out to see what was happening. [T64,88] 
Prior to the time the door was opened, Richard Anderson heard 
an unidentifiable voice say, "leave this camp before we kill you". 
[T82] Eric Tilley and Richard Anderson then followed Sherman 
Gallardo and looked out the door after Sherman Gallardo, who said 
something to the people outside. Eric Tilley testified that 
Sherman Gallardo said, "cool it, Don", and immediately someone 
turned and responded with a threat that, "if you don't want some of 
this, stay inside". [T152] Richard Anderson testified that when 
the door was first opened, Don Brown swung a crescent wrench at 
Richard Anderson and asked him if he wanted some of this. [T67] 
But Appellant in contradiction testified that he was the only 
person who held the crescent wrench that night. [T655] Richard 
Anderson testified that the door remained opened throughout the 
fight; [T88] Eric Tilley, however, in a sharp contradiction to 
Richard Anderson's testimony testified that the door was closed 
-14-
after Sherman Gallardo was threatened, and was reopened by Richard 
Anderson only after a period of five to ten minutes, and was gener-
ally shut. [T154] 
When Richard Anderson first looked out the door, he allegedly 
saw Don Brown, William Cummins, Billy Cayer and the Appellant 
kicking and beating Mike Ramirez. [T66] However, Eric Tilley, who 
was standing in front of Richard Anderson, testified that he saw 
only three people standing around one person lying on the ground 
and that those three people were Appellant, Billy Cayer, and either 
Don Brown or William Cummins, [T153] who look alike, since they 
possess the same build and color of hair. 
Richard Anderson, in contradiction to Eric Tilley's testimony 
stated that he was able to see the persons and events by virtue of 
light emanating from the open doors of trailers #1. [T75-76, 108] 
Eric Tilley testified that only one dim stove light was on in 
trailer #1. [T172] 
Richard Anderson testified that he did not see all of the rest 
of the fight because Sherman Gallardo and he took turns looking out 
the door. [T81, 104] Richard Anderson also testified that William 
Cummins did most of the beating during the times he was watching. 
[T551] The fight gradually moved from the front of trailer #2 to 
behind the amphibian parked in front of trailer #1. [T101] Richard 
Anderson testified he saw William Cummins choking Mike Ramirez 
[T72] and saw him hitting him in the face behind the amphibian 
vehicle. He also saw Appellant hit Mike Ramirez several times with 
a wrench,[T73] prepare to stab Mike Ramirez with a knife, and then 
swung the knife at Sherman Gallardo when he said "you don't want to 
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do that, man". [T67-69] 
Throughout the fight Richard Anderson testified that he con-
sidered Don Brown, William Cummins, Billy Cayer, and the Appellant, 
who were all pretty drunk, to be dangerous, because he didn't know 
just what they would do. [T175] 
Although the fight lasted approximately 45 minutes, according 
to Anderson, all three of the occupants and witnesses of trailer #1 
were military veterans armed with knifes and a large two-by-four, 
yet paradoxically, and to their shame no one in trailer #1 assisted 
Mike Ramirez. [T115-117] Richard Anderson testified he thought 
that the end result of the fight would be a beating, namely, that 
Mike Ramirez would be able to take care of himself and there would 
be no problem. [T560] 
The time discrepancy of the time the fight lasted forty-five 
minutes to an hour, with the testimony of Richard Anderson, [T85] 
was highlighted when Eric Tilley testified it lasted no more than 
15-20 minutes, [T173] and Mike Ramirez then got up, went into his 
trailer and washed himself off. Later around midnight, Richard 
Anderson stated he saw Cummins sitting on the amphibian. [T175] 
Thereafter, at about twenty-minutes later, Don Brown came over to 
trailer #1 to ask the occupants if they had seen anything, and 
Richard Anderson said "no" [T74] in contradiction to his own testi-
mony that he did not do anything to make the Defendants think that 
he was asleep. [T99] 
Around 5:00 a.m., Richard Anderson heard a knock on the door 
of trailer #1. [T77] When Richard Anderson and Sherman Gallardo 
opened the door, Mike Rameriz was seen sitting on the pallet out-
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side the door. He asked them to call 911; told them he couldn't 
breath, and asked for a drink of water. After drinking some water, 
Mike Ramirez collapsed and died. [T77] 
Appellant, who testified at trial, presented a wholly dif-
ferent version of what happened. 
While Eddie Apodaca was in trailer #3, Eddie Apodaca started a 
fight and then left for his trailer. [T633] After Eddie Apodaca 
went back to trailer #2, Billy Cayer left trailer #3, followed by 
William Cummins and Don Brown. [T640] Shortly, thereafter, the 
Appellant went looking for the others and found them in trailer #2 
along with Eddie Apodaca and Mike Ramirez. [T641] After the 
Appellant entered the open door of trailer #2, he testified that 
Mike Ramirez had pulled out a knife and had stabbed Billy Cayer. 
[T642] Appellant then tried to find some nunchukas[T643) in the 
closet but was hampered by the close quarters. Once Appellant got 
out the nunchukas, Billy grabbed the nunchukas from Appellant and 
threw them towards the trailer door. [T644] The Appellant then 
left the trailer by himself. [T644-645] 
Appellant was looking back in the trailer, and suddenly Mike 
Rameriz came out the trailer door and started to attack the 
Appellant. [T646-647] Rameriz kicked the Appellant, and Appellant 
fell backwards into a barrel. Appellant grabbed a crescent wrench 
off the barrel, and told Rameriz "Don't". Rameriz swung twice at 
the Appellant, when Appellant kicked Ramirez. [T647-648] But 
Rameriz would not stop coming with the knife so Appellant hit 
Rameriz with the wrench. [T648] The two struggled, and Appellant 
could only stop Rameriz with the wrench. [T651] Eventually, some 
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other person pulled Appellant and Rameriz apart, [T652] but 
Appellant was still concerned about the knife. Appellant then 
kicked the knife out of Rameriz's hand, and Rameriz then said he 
had had enough. [T653] 
Appellant then went back into trailer #3, [654-655] had 
another drink and thereafter either passed out or fell asleep, and 
did not come to until morning, after Rameriz had died. [T655-656] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court violated Appellant's constitutional right to a 
fair trial and committed reversible error in effectively denying 
the indigent Appellant the right to prepare an adequate defense, 
namely by not timely appointing to the defendant the assistance of 
a private investigator and a court appointed psychiatrist. The 
need for psychiatric evaluation was crucial in light of the 
Appellant's severe intoxication, and particularly where the State 
of Utah placed Appellant's mental state at issue by charging him 
with second degree murder. 
Appellant's trial counsel made a timely objection to the trial 
date set by the District Court Judge; gave necessary notice for a 
Motion For Continuance, and made a reasonable effort to have the 
trial date rescheduled for good cause. The denial of Appellant's 
Motion For Continuance of the trial date severely impaired 
Appellant's defense counsel's ability to adequately prepare, 
especially for cross-examination of the State's eyewitnesses based 
upon their numerous prior and contemporary conflicting statements. 
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Consequently, the trial court violated Appellant's United States 
Sixth Amendment constitution right to effective assistance of 
counsel and abused its discretion in denying a trial continuance to 
allow counsel adequate time to prepare, 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
A FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION BY 
VARIOUS REVERSIBLE ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
INCLUDING THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO CONTINUE 
Appellant asserts that the facts of this case affirmatively 
demonstrate that the Appellant did not receive effective assistance 
of counsel, a fair trial, due process of law, or equal protection 
under the law in violation of his United States Constitutional 
guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment and State of Utah 
constitutional right as guaranteed by Article I Section 12 by the 
arbitrary denials of various motions made by the Defendant, 
especially including motions for continuance. 
Appellant places this claim squarely on the fact that 
throughout the trial, denials of motions for continuance placed the 
Defendant in the position that even on the eve of trial, Defendant 
and his counsel told the Court that they were unprepared to proceed 
through the trial. [Transcript of Hearing held January 18, 1990, 
pages 100-106] The Defendant had waived his right to a Speedy 
Trial [Jan. 18, T27] so as to allow other evidence to be gathered 
in support of his defense (inter alia, find the third eye-witness; 
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get expert testimony on the sound of the generator; further 
psychological examination and testimony for the mental state of the 
Defendant) [Jan. 18, T100-106] as well as to allow Counsel to 
prepare for trial, which was a concern expressed to the Court prior 
to trial. [Jan. 18, T27] 
However, the Trial Court chose to ignore Defendant's requests, 
thereby hampering Defendant's ability to obtain the necessary 
evidence to fairly present his case to the Court, or to properly 
prepare for a trial of this magnitude. 
Further, Appellant cites as grounds for reversal other denials 
of motions by the Court that denied the Appellant his right to a 
fair trial. 
A. Belated Appointment of a Private Investigator To Assist 
the Appellant 
The Trial Court after being requested, initially refused to 
appoint, and then reluctantly and belatedly appointed a private 
investigator to assist Appellant's trial counsel in pretrial 
investigation and preparation, thus prejudicing Appellant's right 
to a fair trial and requiring reversal of his conviction. 
Factually, the prejudice occurred as follows: On October 31, 1989, 
Appellant's appointed trial counsel made an oral motion for the 
appointment of a private investigator to assist him in pretrial 
investigation and preparation. The circuit court denied the motion 
on November 3, 1990. (R12-13, 28). The Appellant filed with the 
court a written Motion for Appointment of Private Investigator for 
Discovery and preparation of Defendant's cases pursuant to U.C.A. 
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77-32-1(3) (Minimum standards provided by County for defense of 
indigent defendants.) The District Court trial judge did not enter 
an Order appointing a private investigator for Appellant until 
January 17, 1990, more than two months after the initial request 
for a private investigator and less than six (6) days before the 
trial date of February 5, 1990. [R. 207-208] (Emphasis Added). 
U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) statutorily requires each county to provide 
indigent persons with the investigatory and other facilities 
necessary to prepare a due process of law defense. Moreover, an 
indigent defendant has a right, cognizable by the Federal 
Constitution, to the Appointment of an investigator or expert at 
State expense to assist in the preparation and presentation of his 
defense. Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th E.) Sec. 414. The 
State of Utah's duty to provide an indigent with the means for an 
appropriate defense stems from a just interplay of the constitu-
tional right to counsel, to a fair trial, and due process of law. 
State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966). See also, Ake v Oklahoma, 
470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98. In the Ake case the 
governmental interest in denying the assistance requested to save 
some money was not considered substantial in light of the compel-
ling interest of both the state and the individual in a fair trial. 
Obviously, the use of a private investigator to perform certain 
duties that the attorney would otherwise have to perform usually 
is cost effective for the State of Utah, in that valuable and 
costly attorney billable time is not wasted on work that otherwise 
a competent investigator would normally do. 
Like the Ake case, U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) manifests the value and 
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importance attributed to providing indigent defendants with the 
assistance requested, namely private investigatory assistance, at 
least in the State of Utah. The facts of this case clearly 
demonstrate that a grave risk of a denial of due process of law 
existed if such private investigatory assistance was not rendered, 
especially where, as here, the criminal charges made were extremely 
grave and involved many conflicting versions made by eyewitnesses, 
and a factual issue was raised in regard to the lighting at the 
scene of the crime which affected the eyewitnesses ability to 
perceive who inflicted the beating, and at what times, and who was 
ultimately involved in the fatal outcome. For example, the State 
of Utah notified Appellant's trial counsel that there would be 
twenty or more witnesses involved. The various written and 
recorded statements of Don Brown, the State's three key witnesses, 
Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie Apodaca, as well as 
another eyewitness, Sherman Gallardo, who disappeared prior to the 
preliminary hearing, contained numerous conflicting and different 
statements of fact. Because of the number of witness statements 
taken; the conflicting factual versions contained therein; the 
discrepancies between the witnesses' stories and Appellant's 
recollection of the events, it was necessary to the preparation of 
an adequate defense that a private investigator be appointed to 
assist in interviewing the witnesses; to point out inconsistencies 
to the witnesses, and attempt to decipher the truth prior to the 
preliminary hearing held on December 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd of 
1989. Equally important was the need to investigate facts of 
Defendant's self-defense claims. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has rightfully recognized that "the 
preliminary hearing is an important step in the criminal process in 
that it serves as both a discovery device and a means to preserve 
evidence for trial." State vs. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1095 (Utah 
1988). Once a witness testifies under oath at a preliminary 
hearing they are less likely to change their stories if presented 
with inconsistencies in their statements, or discrepancies between 
their testimony and that of others. If a preliminary hearing is to 
fully and effectively serve its purposes, the Appellant must have 
the opportunity to interview witnesses prior thereto, so that 
witnesses may take account of discrepancies and inconsistencies 
before their testimony is preserved, and as it were cast in stone. 
If a private investigator had been appointed by the Circuit 
Court Judge and had been available to take pictures of the crime 
scene prior to the preliminary hearing, which contradicted the 
State's eyewitness, these pictures could have been shown to the 
witnesses to facilitate their recollection of exactly who and what 
they were able to see or not see from various vantage points. Most 
notable, Richard Anderson's testimony regarding the events 
occurring in front of either trailer is highly suspect, since 
arguably the door would have obstructed his view (whether open or 
shut). The Appellant's defense was also hampered by the lack of 
information regarding the background of Mike Ramirez and his 
character for violence and all of the key witnesses, all 
transients, that could have been investigated by a private 
investigator. Without such information, Appellant was severely 
restricted in challenging their credibility, or in showing that the 
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victim possessed a violent character in support of the Appellant's 
contention that he was acting in self-defense. The problem of the 
use and need for a private investigator was evident at the time of 
the preliminary hearing and became more acute as the matter neared 
the trial date. A timely motion was made for the appointment of a 
private investigator, but the belated appointment had a devastating 
effect on the ability of defense counsel to prepare, and to allow 
the defendant to prepare his self-defense argument. Add to that 
the denial of Defendant's motion to continue, and there is little 
doubt that the interests of justice were not served in this trial. 
The foregoing leaves little doubt that both the Appellant's 
State and Federal due process of law constitutional right was 
violated, requiring this court to reverse his conviction by the 
belated appointment, by the Trial Court, of a private investigator 
to assist the Appellant in his preparation. 
B. The Denial of a Continuance to Obtain and Denial of 
Appellant's Motion for Psychiatric Assistance Prevented Crucial 
Testimony of Defendant's Intent. 
Appellant argues the First Judicial District Court further 
violated the Appellant's United States Sixth and Fourteenth 
Constitutional Amendment guaranteed rights and State of Utah 
constitutional rights under Article I Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution by denying the Appellant's Motion to Continue so as to 
pursue psychological testing and mental evaluation. On January 16, 
1990, thirteen days after the District Court Arraignment of the 
Appellant on January 3, 1990, Appellant filed with the Trial Court 
the motion along with a Notice of Intent to Call Psychiatric and 
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Other Expert Witnesses and a Notice of Intent to Claim Lack of 
Capacity to Form Intent made for the exclusive purpose of 
establishing, by expert psychiatric testimony, that the Appellant 
was unable to form the necessary intent to commit second degree 
murder because of Appellant's voluntary intoxication, [R.184g, 
187-188, 189, 191-192]. 
The Trial Court allowed some of Appellant's multiple motions, 
but did not allow a continuance for Appellant's counsel to pursue 
such testing or evaluation. In so ruling, the Trial Court 
committed error since it was a denial of due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution for the State to deny an indigent defendant the needed 
assistance of a psychiatric expert, where as here, the defendant's 
mental state at the time of the offense was a substantial factor in 
his defense. 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Ake vs. Oklahoma 
strongly supports the conclusion that the Trial Court was the 
erring party in this trial. 470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S Ct. 1087. 
1092-98, 84 L Ed. 2d 53 (1985). In Ake the United States Supreme 
Court held that a state is required to provide an indigent 
defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist to support his 
insanity defense based, in part, upon the following reasoning: 
"The Court has long recognized that when a State 
brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps 
to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to 
present his defense. This elementary principle, 
grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental 
fairness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be 
equal, where, simply as a result of his poverty, a 
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defendant is denied the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his 
liberty is at stake • . . To implement this principle, 
we have focused on identifying the "basic tools of an 
adequate defense or appeal" , and we have required that 
such tools be provided to those defendants who cannot 
afford to pay for them. . . Three factors are relevant 
to this determination. The first is the private 
interest that will be affected by the action of the 
State. The second is the governmental interest that 
will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. 
The third is the probable value of the additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected 
interest if those safeguards are not provided. 
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal 
proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty 
at risk is almost uniquely compelling . . . At the same 
time, it is difficult to identify any interest of the 
State, other than that in its economy, that weighs 
against recognition of this right . . . We therefore 
conclude that the governmental interest in denying Ake 
the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in 
light of the compelling interest of both the state and 
the individual in accurate dispositions". 
470 U.S. at 76-79, 105 S. Ct. at 1092-94 (citations 
omitted; emphasis added). 
The Court then cited to numerous state statutes, including 
Utah Code Anno. 77-32-1, and other court decisions which recognized 
an indigent defendants right to the assistance of a psychiatrist's 
expertise as reflecting: 
"[the] reality.. .that when the State has made the 
defendant's mental condition relevant to this criminal 
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the 
assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial of the 
defendants ability to marshal his defense". 
470 U.S. at 80, 105 S. Ct. at 1095. 
From these strong judicial pronouncements it is not difficult 
to conclude that the Trial Court here violated Appellants Federal 
and State constitutional rights to a fair trial, where as here, the 
Appellant's state of mind, especially in light of a self-defense 
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argument, compounded by excessive drinking, should have been 
properly evaluated by a psychiatrist. See Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 
105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98. C.f., State v Woods, 648 P.2d 71, 88 
(Utah 1981) ("The refusal to grant an indigent defendant's timely 
motion for psychiatric assistance in a capital case is an abuse of 
discretion... .It is also a denial of due process"). 
The following mens rea, mental state required by Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 76-5-203(1) for a conviction of guilty of second degree 
murder are stated as: 
(1) intentionally or knowingly causing death of another; 
(2) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another; 
(3) commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
causes the death of another; 
(4) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life engages in conduct which 
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another. 
See State v Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 263-65 (Utah 1988). In this 
case, expert psychiatric testimony was crucial to the central issue 
of whether the Appellant, due to voluntary intoxication, was unable 
to form the requisite intent to commit homicide. 
C.f, State v Miller, 677 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1984) (the exclusion of 
expert psychiatric testimony on the issue of intent was found to be 
reversible error); State v Sessions, 645 P.2d 643,645 (Utah 1982) 
("basic rules of evidence pertaining to materiality and relevance 
require that a defendant have the right to adduce evidence which 
would tend to disprove the existence of specific intent"). The 
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facts in this case do not demonstrate that the Appellant knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his due process right to the assistance of a 
psychiatric expert. 
C• The Denial of Appellant's Motion for the Jury to View the 
Scene, 
Discharge of the jury's duty to judge the evidence fairly and 
render a considered verdict depended upon the jury's view of the 
crime scene. The request for a jury view, which the trial judge 
refused to allow, further constituted an abuse of the court's 
discretion to see that a fair trial had occurred. The evidence 
adduced at trial did not adequately portray the lines of sight and 
dim light by which the eyewitnesses were, or were not able to see 
the events. In that setting, without question, sound judicial 
discretion should have granted to the jury the right to view the 
scene of the homicide for the purpose of assessing the weight to be 
given, in particular, to Richard Anderson's eyewitness testimony in 
light of the weighty, conflicting evidence. 
The crime took place near midnight in late October in a rural 
area. The only lighting was from dim trailer house lights. Only 
one witness, Richard Anderson, stated Appellant was involved in the 
major part of the fight that occurred outside the trailer house. 
Richard Anderson's testimony is inconsistent in numerous aspects 
with his prior statements, and preliminary hearing testimony and 
with the statements and testimony of other witnesses. His line of 
sight in all probability was also obstructed by door frames and 
vehicles. All this was either pointed out or alluded to when the 
oral motion was made [see 1/18 transcript, p. 11 - 13, 17]. With 
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the verdict hinging on such inconsistent eyewitness testimony, it 
cannot be said that a refusal to permit a jury view of the crime 
scene fell within the Trial Court's sound judicial discretion. 
Rather, such a crime scene view would have contributed 
substantially to the presentation of Appellant's defense based on 
inadequate eyewitnesses identification of the Appellant. An 
appropriate ruling by this Court would be to reverse Appellant's 
conviction on the grounds that the Trial Court abused its sound 
discretion by not permitting a jury view of the crime scene under 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 17(i) • 
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO SIT ALL DAY 
IN THE JURY ROOM WHILE WAITING FOR THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO BE 
PREPARED. 
Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred when the jury 
was allowed to sit in the jury room all day long while the Court, 
along with the attorneys prepared the jury instructions. Appellant 
contends that doing so was a denial of a right to a fair trial in 
that after four days of testimony, the jury took less than three 
hours to conclude it's verdict. It is Appellant's claim that the 
jury could not have reviewed the days of testimony, especially the 
conflicting testimony of the State's own witnesses, during such a 
short time frame. 
There was testimony of Appellant's own self-defense as well as 
the testimony of all the other witnesses that needed to be 
reviewed. The only way, Appellant himself contends, for the jury 
to make up it's mind is that they impermissibly decided the case 
before the case along with the jury instructions were submitted to 
them. [See R 354] 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S MISCONDUCT, INCLUDING 
ALLOWING PERJURY, AS WELL AS CONTACT BETWEEN 
WITNESSES, CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Defendant/Appellant requests that counsel submit to this Court 
for review four specific acts of the prosecuting attorney that 
Defendant/Appellant claims are actions that warrant reversible 
error in this matter: 
A. Allowing perjured testimony of Richard Anderson, 
an eye-witness, to be used at trial; 
B. By discounting Defendant's claim of self-defense, 
by remarking that it was made up and rehearsed; 
C. Failure to produce the so-called weapon (sharpening 
stone) used in the aggravated assault against 
Eddie Apodaca. 
D. Vouching for the credibility of a witness. 
A. PERJURED TESTIMONY OF RICHARD ANDERSON 
One of the eye-witnesses to the events, Richard Anderson, 
testified that he directly saw what happened on the evening of 
October 25, 1989. Yet, testimony of other eye witnesses sharply 
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contrasted with what Mr, Anderson stated. [See Statement of 
Relevant Facts of Issues Presented For Review]. 
Defendant claims the County Attorney impermissibly: 
(1) allowed Richard Anderson to testify falsely when 
it was known that Richard Anderson was not telling 
the truth because of the inconsistency of the 
stories as well as the fact that Richard Anderson 
could not have seen what he claimed he saw; 
(2) allowed Richard Anderson to change his 
testimony, when another eye-witness contradicted 
Mr. Anderson as to a key point in- the testimony 
after Mr. Anderson was told outside the Courtroom 
that the other witness contradicted Anderson's 
story. 
In support of his claim that perjured testimony was allowed, 
Defendant points out that neither Richard Anderson nor Eddie 
Apodaca could see what they claimed to have seen (inter alia, 
people from sixty feet away between two trailers; the happenings 
outside trailer #2 or #1 because the door was closed). As the 
Prosecuting Attorney knew or should have known that such testimony 
was incorrect, it should not have been used. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
use of false or perjured testimony by the State to obtain a 
conviction, when the State knows that such testimony is false is a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. They 
have also held that it is of no consequence that the false 
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testimony concerned the witness' credibility. 
The Supreme Court said in the case of Napue vs. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264, 31ed 2d 1217, 79 S Ct. 1173 (1959) that, 
First, it is established that a conviction obtained 
through use of false evidence, known to be such by 
representative of the State, must fall under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Mooney vs. Holohan, 294 US 103, 70 
L ed 791, 55 S CT 340, 98 ALR 406; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 
US 213, 87 L ed 214, 63 S CT 177; Curran v. Delaware 
(DA3 Del) 259 F.2d 707. See New York ex rel. Whitman v. 
Wilson, 318 US 688, 87 L ed 1083, 63 S Ct 840, and White 
v. Ragan, 324 US 760 89 L ed 1348, 65 S Ct 978. Compare 
Jones v. Kentucky (CA 6 KY) 97 F2d 335, 338, with Re 
Sawyer's Petition (CA7 Wis) 229 F2d 805, 809, Df . 
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 US 1, 1 Led 2d 1, 77 S Ct 
1, 9. The same result obtains when the State, although 
not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go 
uncorrected when it appears. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 US 
28, 2 L ed 2d 9, 78 S Ct 103; United States ex rel. 
Thompson v. Dye (AA3 Pa) 221 F2d 763; United States ex 
rel. Almeida v. Baldi (CA3 Pa) 195 F2d 815, 33 ALRwd 
1407; United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen (DC 111) 
86 F Supp 382. See generally annotation, 2 L ed 2d 
1575. 
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evi-
dence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, 
implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply 
merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of 
the witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and relia-
bility of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt of 
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible 
interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's 
life or liberty may depend. As stated by the New York Court of 
Appeals in a case very similar to this one, People v. Savvides, 1 
NY2d 554, 557, 154 NYS 2d 885, 887, 136 NE2d 853, 854, 855. 
"It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore 
upon the witness' credibility rather than directly upon 
defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its 
subject, and if it is any way relevant to the case, the 
district attorney has the responsibility and duty to 
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correct what he knows to be false and elicit truth . . . 
That the district attorney's silence was not the result 
of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for 
its impact was the same, preventing, as it did, a trial 
that could in any real sense be termed fair." 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically addressed the 
question of when the police knew of information that the prosecutor 
did not in the case of Barbee v. Warden, Maryland, Penitentiary, 
331 F2d 842 (1964). The Court said, 
"Nor is the effect of the nondisclosure neutralized 
because the prosecuting attorney was not shown to have 
had knowledge of the exculpatory evidence. Failure of 
the police to reveal such material evidence in their 
possession is equally harmful to a defendant whether the 
information is purposely, or negligently, withheld. And 
it makes no difference if the withholding is by 
officials other than the prosecutor. The police are 
also a part of the prosecution, and the taint on the 
trial is no less if they, rather than the State's 
Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure." 
The Court went on further to say, 
"With respect to the necessity for a showing of 
prejudice, the cases sometimes draw a distinction 
between the knowing use of false testimony and the 
passive nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence. In the 
first type of case the sentence will be set aside 
without inquiring into whether the defendant has been 
prejudiced, while in the latter some consideration of 
the possible effect of the irregularity upon the 
fairness of the trial is necessary." 
The issue was addressed by this Court in the case of Walker 
vs. State 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981) where the Court held that, 
"It is an accepted premise in American 
Jurisprudence that any conviction obtained by the 
knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair 
and totally incompatible with rudimentary demands of 
justice! The proposition is firmly established that 
conviction obtained through the use of false evidence 
known to be such by representatives of the State, must 
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fall under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Article I Section 7, of the Utah 
Constitution, if there is any reasonable likelihood that 
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of 
the jury. The same result obtains when the State, 
although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go 
uncorrected when it appears. This standard derives from 
both the prosecutorial misconduct and more importantly 
the fact that the use of false evidence involved a 
corruption of the truth seeking function in the trial 
process." 
For his second point, Defendant points out, Eric Tilley 
testified that Richard Anderson left the trailer to search the only 
truck for keys. Richard Anderson had testified that he had not 
left the trailer. 
Deputy Dale Ward (who had been identified as a witness) then 
contacted Richard Anderson to tell him of the contradiction of 
testimony. Such contact between witnesses was in violation of the 
Court's order of the exclusion of witnesses. In fact, Mr. Anderson 
was told not to discuss the case with other witnesses, [T147] which 
would include the Sheriff's Deputy that had sat at trial to assist 
the Prosecuting Attorney. 
Thereafter, Richard Anderson was recalled to testify regarding 
his leaving the trailer to search the truck, and without 
explanation, he changed his story from not going outside his 
trailer [T90, 136] to one that he in fact did. [T147] 
Defendant maintains that the Prosecuting Attorney 
allowing Dale Ward to violate the exclusionary rule and 
testimony after Dale Ward spoke to Richard Anderson,, 
The leading Utah cases dealing with prosecutorial misconduct 
provide a two-step evaluation process; whether misconduct occurred 
and whether the jury is probably influenced by the actions. State 
erred by 
using the 
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v. Troy, 688 P. 2d 483 (UT 1984); State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (UT 
1973) . 
Certainly step one is evident* To allow a prosecuting 
attorney to circumvent the exclusionary rule is an act that crosses 
the boundary wherein discretion is allowed. Bad faith need not be 
shown. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1255 (UT 1988). 
Regarding step two, clearly the Prosecuting Attorney was so 
concerned regarding the contradiction that he asked the the witness 
to quash that contradiction when the witness was recalled in 
Defendant's main case. The Defendant's attack on the credibility 
of Richard Anderson and the veracity of the story that Richard 
Anderson made up was a key point to the defense of Defendant. It 
was always Defendant's contention that Richard Anderson had wanted 
to somehow show that he was brave in light of the occurrences that 
night; as well as the fact that he molded his testimony to prove 
such a point. By allowing the testimony to come in the way it did 
(in violation of the exclusionary rule) it allowed the jury to not 
consider the claim of the Defendant that Richard Anderson had made 
up part of his story to protect himself from the shame of not 
rendering assistance in a situation where he thought help was 
needed. 
Anderson claimed he was terrified of the happenings, yet it 
became known, through another witness, that he had indeed left the 
security of the trailer. Defendant claims that the Prosecuting 
Attorney should not have used the testimony of Richard Anderson 
after he had been caught in his lie. That was using perjured 
testimony and the Prosecuting Attorney should not have done so at 
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all. 
B. ARGUMENTS REGARDING SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM 
Defendant presented testimony that his actions in striking 
Rameriz were done in self-defense. The Prosecuting Attorney 
discounted that, and in closing arguments presented more than just 
theory, he presented evidence as to how the Prosecutor's theory of 
the fabrication of self-defense came about and that the story was 
not true or rehearsed. [T 740, 743, 745, 746, 750] Even that 
evidence was destroyed [T 732, 733] or placed. 
The prosecutor repeatedly violated the prosecutorial and 
ethical duty to refrain from improper remarks made to the jury 
panel which were calculated to incite a conviction on references to 
the nature of the Defendant's position [a transient, T785] crime as 
well as the concocted nature of the Defendant's self-defense. The 
duty of a prosecuting attorney has been aptly described in 
Commonwealth v. Gilman, 368 A2d 253 (Pa. 1977) wherein the 
Pennsylvania high court stated: 
11
 [T]he prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer 
representing the Commonwealth. His duty is to seek 
justice, not just convictions . . ." 
"Although the prosecutor operates within the 
adversary system, it is fundamental that his obligation 
is to protect the innocent as well as to convict the 
guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to 
enforce the rights of the public." 
During closing argument, the prosecution has an obligation to: 
11
. . . present facts so that the jury can dispas-
sionately and objectively evaluate the testimony in a 
sober and reflective frame of mind that will produce a 
judgment warranted by the evidence and not inspired by 
emotion or passion. 
The prosecutor's position as both an administrator of 
justice and an advocate "gives him a responsibility not 
to be vindictive or attempt in any manner to influence 
the jury by arousing their prejudices." In particular, 
the prosecutor must limit his argument to the facts in 
evidence and legitimate inferences therefrom," 
(at 257 citations omitted). 
The Box Elder County Attorney's statements were brought to the 
attention of the trial judge by way of the Motion for New Trial. 
The error of which Appellant complained to the Trial Court was that 
the prosecutor repeatedly suggested to the jury that Appellant 
conspired to fabricate the story of self-defense. There was never 
any evidence adduced that a jury could reasonably infer Ray 
Cabututan conspired to commit perjury or the self-defense claim. 
The Appellant asserts that the Trial Courts denial of the motion 
for new trial constituted an abuse of discretion and the 
prosecutors remarks constituted plain error. 
An abuse of discretion occurs when, taking into account any 
remedial measures ordered by the Trial Court, the prejudice to the 
defendant still satisfies the standard for reversible error set 
forth in Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 30. Errors and defects. The 
remedial measure of a new trial was requested, but refused. 
C. FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE WEAPON FOR THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Appellant claims that there should have been no conviction on 
the charge of aggravated assault because the sharpening stone was 
not produced so as to give the jury the opportunity to determine if 
the weapon was in fact a deadly weapon as stated in the 
information. 
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D
* VOUCHING FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS 
Finally, the prosecution committed plain error in vouching for 
the credibility of Richard Anderson. [T 746] See United States v 
Ludwig, 508, F. 2d 140, 143 (10th Cri. 1974), and otherwise 
interjecting his personal opinions on such matters regarding 
Richard Anderson having no reason to lie. [T 784, 787] It was 
prejudicial error for the Box Elder County Attorney to inject his 
personal opinion regarding Richard Anderson's credibility, thereby 
clearly and improperly intruding upon the jury's exclusive function 
of evaluating the credibility of witnesses. In such a case, 
without the Court immediately intervening and taking curative 
action in regard to the Box Elder County Attorney vouching for the 
credibility of a witness, a jury has no choice but to give such 
statements full credibility, since they came by and through the 
power and prestige of the office of the Box Elder County Attorney. 
See Gilman, 368 A.2d at 258-59. As previously noted, it has been 
firmly established by case law that a prosecutor may not express 
his personal opinion regarding a defendant's guilt, credibility or 
trial strategy. Id. at 258. 
However, it was done so in this matter and was an error that 
the Court allowed to the detriment of the Defendant inasmuch as the 
conflicting nature of the State's witnesses (Tilley and Anderson on 
the ability to see and the open door). Such a departure from the 
standards mandates that the decision of the Trial Court be 
reversed. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE CONSTITUTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The First Judicial District Court committed reversible error 
by denying the Appellant's Motion for continuance of the trial date 
set (p. 150). While the granting of a continuance is within the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion, an abuse may be found 
where a party has made timely objections, given necessary notice 
and made a reasonable effort to have the trial date reset for good 
cause, as occurred in this criminal case. State v Creviston, 646 
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). The denial of a motion for continuance 
may also constitute reversible error on the grounds that the denial 
effectively obviated Defendant's United States Constitutional 
guarantee to effective assistance of counsel whereby counsel lacks 
sufficient time to prepare his defense. See Hintz v Beto, 379 F.2d 
937, 942 (5th Cir. 1967) Among other things, the lawyer was denied 
the opportunity to review and analyze the self-defense argument; 
review the claim of capacity; analyze the separate nature of the 
trials and its affect on Defendant's claim of self-defense. 
On January 3, 1990, the Trial Court scheduled the trial for 
January 22, 1990, through January 26, 1990, over the strong oral 
objections of Appellant's counsel. In denying the Motion For 
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Continuance for Trial Date, the Trial Court failed to inquire as to 
the amount of time that Appellant's counsel deemed necessary to 
prepare for trial, or to schedule a pretrial conference, as 
provided for by Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
address preparation and other relevant trial issues. The Court 
also failed to schedule a pretrial conference as required by the 
Court's own rules. (See Appendix, attached to this brief.) 
Shortly thereafter, on January 10, 1990, Appellant filed with the 
Trial Court a written Motion for Continuance of the Trial Date. [R. 
142]. Among the numerous grounds stated for a continuance of the 
trial date cited in Appellant's Motion, was the pertinent fact that 
Appellant's counsel had not yet received a copy of the 949 pages of 
transcript of the Preliminary Hearing for counsel examination. In 
addition to the necessity of reviewing the voluminous Preliminary 
Hearing transcript, Appellant's counsel, during the short time 
remaining prior to trial, was faced with the following preparatory 
trial responsibilities that required sufficient attorney time for: 
(1) the need to review and carefully analyze the extra-
ordinary amounts of physical, documentary, and expert evidence, 
including the statements of various witnesses; 
(2) the need to review and analyze, not only by counsel, 
but also by experts assisting counsel, documentary evidence 
generated by the State's medical examiner and forensic blood 
expert, which the prosecution had agreed to provide to Appellant's 
counsel at the Preliminary Hearing, but which Appellant's counsel 
had not received as of the date of the Motion for Continuance on 
January 10, 1990; 
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(3) interview potential witnesses, including Pat 
Bentzley and Darrell Green, the Appellant's boss and a supervisor 
at Western Brine Shrimp Company, who each, according to the 
Appellant, at least would have testified that Appellant was a good 
worker and would otherwise provide good character testimony; 
(4) the need to consult with and prepare the trial 
testimony Dr. Finkle, the Court appointed toxicologist expert, on 
the effects of alcohol on an individual who had consumed as much 
alcohol as the Appellant had on the night of October 25, 1989; 
(5) the need to obtain accurate photographic evidence of 
the crime scene that would depict the lines of sight of the various 
State witnesses, and the dimness of the lighting from the trailer 
houses at night; and 
(6) additionally, the need to consult with a psychiatric 
expert on the Appellant's ability to form the requisite intent for 
the charged crime of Second Degree Murder. The time constraints 
imposed by the Trial Court in denying Appellant's Motion For a 
Continuance of Trial Date adversely impaired the Appellant's United 
States Constitutional and Constitution of Utah guarantee to effec-
tive assistance of counsel and to a fair trial, at least in the 
following: 
Appellant's counsel did not have sufficient time to 
review, in any depth, the Preliminary Hearing transcripts or the 
written statements and transcribed interviews of various key 
witnesses. Clearly, reversible error was committed as a result of 
the Court in denying Appellant's Motion to Continue the trial date 
to allow defense counsel to adequately prepare for trial, 
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especially where the charges made were so grave. 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
states in part: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right...to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defense." 
The standard of review applied to cases where the 
assistance of counsel is challenged has been established 
by the United States Supreme Court. The Court has 
stated, 
"To succeed on a claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel requires a showing that counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the Defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 
(1984), 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 219 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah, 1986). 
And further, in order to show prejudice to his case, Defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the 
confidence of the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 649, see also 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 219; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1023 
(Utah, 1987); State v. Wynia, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. 
Defendant claims that errors were committed at trial due to 
the Court's failure to allow adequate time to prepare for trial [R. 
352-356]. Those errors were as follows: 
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Failure to: 
(1) adequately cross-examine witnesses; 
(2) object to Jury panel or insure that minorities were 
on panel; 
(3) determine whether to separate or join trials with 
Co-Defendants [Jan, 18 T 80 - 81]; 
(4) investigate alcohol/intent claims by a psychiatrist; 
(5) adequately prepare the self-defense argument. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
On March 2, 1990, Appellant filed a Motion For A New Trial 
based upon 14 separate arguments of misconduct, abuse of 
discretion, and new testimony that was formally unavailable to the 
Defendant [R. 348-351]. In support of the Motion, the Defendant, 
himself, filed an Affidavit [R. 352-356]. 
After consideration of the oral arguments, the Trial Court 
denied the Motion For A New Trial [R. 368]. Appellant claims that 
new evidence, formally unavailable to be presented, now existed 
which would exculpate the Defendant. 
It is a rule that newly discovered evidence which merely seeks 
to impeach prosecution witnesses does not ordinarily warrant a new 
trial. But, the District Court held in U.S. v. Atkinson (D.C. N.Y. 
1977) 492 F Sup. 880, that in some circumstances it is sufficiently 
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important so that a new trial should be ordered. 
On a Motion For A New Trial, the Court must review the 
challenged trial proceedings to ensure that the dictates of due 
process have been met. It is the obligation of the Court to ensure 
that fundamental fairness has been provided. U.S. v. Narciso (D.C. 
Mich. 1977) 446 F Sup 252. 
The issue is the integrity of the judicial process. The Court 
could not have made a full determination of findings without having 
heard the evidence. It refused to hear the evidence. This was a 
mistake, and in and of itself constituted an abuse of discretion. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Harris (Utah 
1973) 513 Pac. 2d 438, 439, 440: 
"The denial of (a Motion For A New Trial on the 
Ground of Newly Discovered Evidence) will be deemed an 
abuse of discretion...where there is a grave suspicion 
that justice may have been miscarried because of the 
lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which new 
evidence will supply..." 
The Jury never heard the evidence sought to be presented by 
the defense on the Motion For A New Trial. The Judge never heard 
the evidence. Neither the Judge nor the Jury, therefore, was able 
to be enlightened on a vital point. 
Appellant claims that the trials of the other Defendants 
produced testimony that he, himself, had been the one: 
(1) to hit Rameriz; 
(2) was the only one outside when it happened, and 
(3) that he was not seen later. 
At trial, Defendant sought to have the three (3) Co-Defendants 
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testify. However, each of them, facing their own trial, refused to 
testify by invoking their Fifth Amendment rights. 
However, after trial, their testimony, which was not contra-
dictory but exculpatory to the Appellant was available by way of 
transcript. 
Defendant, having tried to present at trial this testimony, 
which only became available to him after the trial of the other 
three (3) Co-Defendants, should now be allowed to use the same. 
It should be noted that each of the Co-Defendants had the 
opportunity to use Appellant's testimony (and at least 2 did so). 
POINT V 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE 
THE JURY, COURT AND CRIMINAL SYSTEM 
WAS PREJUDICIAL TOWARDS HIM 
Counsel submits the argument, pursuant to Defendant's wishes, 
and under the Rules pursuant to Anders v California, 386 U.S. 738, 
87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 2d 443 (1967) that Defendant was denied a 
fair trial due to biased opinions against him based upon his race. 
In support of this position, Defendant maintains that: 
A. Defendant was not tried by a jury of his peers because 
there were no minorities on either the jury or jury panel. 
B. The Court thought the Defendant was a Hispanic rather 
than American-Filipino [R 64]. 
C. Someone on the jury panel stated that the Defendant was 
Mexican, obviously calling to that person's attention and those 
seated near him that the Defendant was a minority. [Hearing on 
Motion for New Trial, March 23, T 10] 
D. The conservative history of Box Elder County was such 
that no minority could receive a fair trial, as evidenced by the 
fact that after for days of testimony, the jury took less than two 
hours to decide 3 counts [March 23, T 10] and found the Defendant 
guilty on the charges. 
E. The Court refused to allow the Defendant to call the 
three Co-Defendants, even though they may have only exercised their 
Fifth Amendment right to not provide self-incrimination. [Jan. 18, 
T 76 - 80] 
POINT VI 
THE NUMEROUS SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS COMMITTED 
AMOUNT TO CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Even assuming that none of the foregoing substantial errors, 
in and of themselves constituted reversible error, the cumulative 
impact of each error prejudiced Appellant's right to a fair trial 
thus constituting reversible error. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501-02 (Utah, 1986). Confidence in the verdict is undermined, 
at least to the extent that, in the absence of the cumulative 
errors, a reasonable probability exists that even if the jury 
disregarded the claim of self-defense, the Appellant would have 
been convicted of one of the lesser-included offenses of man-
slaughter or negligent homicide due to his voluntary intoxication 
and lack of formation of the requisite intent to commit Second 
Degree Murder. Under such circumstances, reversal is warranted. 
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See State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah, 1989). 
In Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okla. Crim. App• 1980), 
the Court announced a similar test: 
"[W]hen a review of the entire record reveals 
numerous irregularities that tend to prejudice the 
rights of a defendant and where an accumulation of 
errors denies a defendant a fair trial, the case 
will be reversed, even though one of the errors, 
standing alone, would not be ample to justify 
reversal." 
Such is the case now before the Court. Throughout the entire 
process, the cumulative weight of the errors committed required a 
reversal and at the least a remand to the Trial Court for a new 
trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the appropriate remedy is for this 
Court to reverse his conviction and grant Appellant a new trial 
because of the numerous substantial and prejudicial errors which 
are apparent on the face of the record which undermine confidence 
in the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted this |£ day of February, 1991. 
w 
Quinn D. Hunsaker 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct 
copies of Appellant's Brief on Appeal to: R. Paul Van Dam, 
Attorney General, 236 State Capital Building, Salt Lake City, UT 
84114. 
DATED this \1 day of M™ 1991. 
hi 
Attorney 
Appendix 
Local Rules of the First Judicial District Court 
b. Continuances will be recorded in the file to 
give the court information on continuances. Who 
requested, reason, etc. 
CRIMINAL CASE MANAGEMENT: 
1. FILING OF CRIMINAL CHARGE 
a. When an appeal or a case is bound over from 
the Circuit Court the matter will be placed on 
the next Law and Motion calendar for arraignment, 
b. At the time of arraignment and if the 
Defendant wants to enter a "NOT GUILTY" plea, the 
court will then give the Defendant's Counsel and 
the County Attorney's office two weeks to see if 
a negotiation is possible. (Negotiation time 
will depend on type of case and discovery time) 
After the time allowed for negotiations the 
defendant and his/her counsel must appear before 
the court either to change the plea, dismiss the 
case or to set a trial date. At that time a 
trial setting will be given in court to the 
defendant and counsel. 
c. If a settlement cannot be reached through the 
plea negotiations and a trial date is set by the 
court, it will: 
1. Go to trial on the original charge. 
2. No plea negotiations will be 
accepted by the court. 
3. The defendant can enter a plea of 
guilty to the original charge. 
